Multi-Party Game and Simulation of Government Impact on the Development of Agricultural Supermarket Docking
FU Shuaishuai1, CHEN Weida1, DING Junfei1, WANG Dandan2
1. School of Economics and management, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, China; 2. College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 210016, China
Abstract：Considering the influence of government guidance on the decision-making of farmers and supermarket chain enterprises during the development of agricultural super-docking, an evolutionary game model was constructed with government, enterprises and farmers, investigate the interaction mechanism of strategy choice between different subjects, and with the help of the simulation analysis of different members operation behavior, the influence of the farmers and stable operation. The result shows that the value perception of government policy support and subsidies by farmers and companies, as well as the level of participation costs and benefits, are important factors that affect the decision-making behavior of both parties; the low punishment intensity is benefit the government and companies in the direction of active operation evolution. Medium supervision intensity is helpful for both sides to reach an agreement on the business operation of "connecting farmers and supermarkets". Otherwise, the supervision cost will be too high, resulting in the dilemma of government policy guidance. Finally, it is pointed that the government should continue to play a leading role in the development of agricultural super docking. And put forward countermeasures and suggestions to promote its healthy and orderly development.
付帅帅, 陈伟达, 丁军飞, 王丹丹. 政府对“农超对接”发展影响的多方博弈与仿真[J]. 复杂系统与复杂性科学, 2020, 17(3): 52-61.
FU Shuaishuai, CHEN Weida, DING Junfei, WANG Dandan. Multi-Party Game and Simulation of Government Impact on the Development of Agricultural Supermarket Docking. Complex Systems and Complexity Science, 2020, 17(3): 52-61.
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