Abstract：This paper tries address the problem of regulatory capture in drug safety governance resulting from information asymmetry and hidden behavior of subjects. To achieve this, this paper employs evolutionary game theory to construct a three-party evolutionary game model that includes the State Drug Administration, the local Drug Administration, and the drug manufacturer. Then the Evolutionary Stability Strategies (ESS) are obtained, and a simulation analysis is conducted to analyze the impact of each parameter on the regulatory capture of the drug administrations. In addition, this paper focuses on the effects of the penalty intensity of the State Drug Administration on the local Drug Administration and drug manufacturers. Based on the findings, recommendations are provided for the government.
谢振雨, 万安霞. 药品安全治理演化博弈及策略研究[J]. 复杂系统与复杂性科学, 2024, 21(2): 129-136.
XIE Zhenyu, WAN Anxia. Research on Evolutionary Game and Strategy of Drug Safety Governance[J]. Complex Systems and Complexity Science, 2024, 21(2): 129-136.
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